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ABSTRACT

The central theme of this study is to explore the

growth and causes of a relatively new form of "property
crime" - the large scale theft of high technology products

while these products are in transit from the point of
manufacture to the point of market (retail stores, end
users). For the purpose of this study, high technology

products may be defined as computers, computer monitors,
computer hard drives, microchips and other computer
peripherals•

This study presents evidence that the growth of cargo
theft as measured by dollar loss, particularly since 1990,

is directly related to the dynamic growth of the high
technology manufacturing industry in America. Furthermore,
current law enforcement efforts to combat this problem are

insufficient, and if future efforts are not undertaken on a

highly organized nationwide scale, this criminal enterprise
will flourish and continue to grow.

Four facets which comprehensively describe and analyze

the criminal problem of high technology cargo theft are

examined, chapter by chapter. Chapter I focuses on defining
what cargo theft is, provides a historical overview of

cargo theft in the U.S., present current cargo theft dollar
iii

loss estimates,

examines rising cargo theft trends theft

problems that owe to the burgeoning growth of high
technology-

product manufacturing in the U.S., and describes

the modus operandi utilized in committing this crime. It

will also provide a description of the groups who engage in
large-scale cargo theft, and report details on the

"fencing" operations through which the stolen cargo is
distributee and sold.

Chapter ,11 examines the growth of the high technology

product manufacturing industry since the late 1980*s, and
describes the rising consumer demand for these products as

measured by the increasing yearly dollar amounts of all
total high technology products manufactured in the U.S.

Chapter III presents data that details the rise in
cargo theft in the past ten years and describes law
enforcement response to the formation of the criminal

industry that has developed around the theft of high
technology products.

A review of legislative response to

the high technology cargo theft problem will also be
included.

Chapter IV provides a discussion of the findings and
conclusions of this study, with suggestions for future

IV

researGh. It

includes policy implications and

recominendations

for establishing a framework; for future

of high technology cargo theft, especially as

prevention

they relate to improved documentation of such theft,
Chapte r

y consists of a conclusion that succinctly

the problem, its extent, and briefly restates

reiterates

the recommendations
The dc:ta
0.S i

of this- study.

utilized in this study has been obtained from

Government

documents, private industry manufacturing

statistics, and law enforcement investigative teams that

specialize in the investigation of cargo thefts. These

demonstrate that a Ainltibillion dollar criminal

data will

industry

has

evolved as a result of the rise of high

technology manufacturing in the U.S. This study also
shows that

while manufa;cturing rates and the rates Of theft

of high technology
system strategies
pace. An outline

crime is,

products have grown, criminal justice

to combat this problem have hot kept

for improved prevention of this type of

herefore, offered.
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CHAPTER ONE

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
CARGO THEFT

Introduction

The movement of goods from point of manufacture to
market in the U.S. is dependent upon the effective

operation of a smooth flowing commercial cargo
transportation infrastructure. The primary modes of

transportation of goods in the U.S. are trucks, airplanes.
and railro ads. For the purposes of this study, the theft of

these goods while they are within the commercial
transportstion system is referred to as cargo theft. Large
scale thefts

of goods have hampered the U.S. distribution

system for many years.
The first

attempt at quantifying the extent of cargo

theft in the U.S. was initiated in the late 1970's and

early 1980 s (Publicover, 1999) by the Department of
Transporta tion (DOT) Office of Transportation Security
(OTS). The OTS was established within the DOT for the

purpose of researching and quantifying the cargo theft
problem ar.d organizing a government campaign against it.
The OTS ut.ilized

combined industry and government resources

and staffing,

and was given a mandate to work with private

industry on this serious problem (Badolato, 2000). Until

of the OTS in 1982, it provided both law

the demise

enforcement

and private industry with reports on topics

cargo theft. Unfortunately, no such government

related to

entity as i:he OTS is in existence today. Perhaps the most

significant study to emerge from this era, however, was a
government General Accounting Office (GAO) study

(Comptroller General of the United States, General

Accounting Office (GAO), (1980), which identified the
extent of

cargo crime in the United States and evaluated

the perform,ance of the OTS in examining this crime. The GAO

study foun

that while the OTS had estimated that 1977

losses due

to cargo theft amounted to approximately 1

billion doliars

(adjusted for inflation the GAO figure

would equal approximately 1.8 billion 1997 dollars), the
OTS analys s "underestimated the amount of theft-related
losses" (G.AO, 1980). The GAO attributed the underestimation
of losses

by the OTS to data relying solely on submissions

only from large cargo carriers, omitting for the most part,
medium and smaller sized carriers from the study

(Publicover, 1999). Moreover-^ the GAO study stated that
indirect c asts,

such as filing claims, investigations, and

paying claims on these losses were believed to be two to
three times

the amount of the actual losses, bringing the

total cost to

somewhere between 2 and 5 billion dollars

(GAO, 1980). Perhaps most important in terms of error,
however, is the fact that OTS study did not address the

issue of intentionally underreported or unreported losses.

Chronic Reporting Problems

In attempting to gauge any truly representative dollar

loss figure, as cited in the 1980 GAO study, unreported and
underreported losses were a major impediment twenty years

ago and they remain so today. Many cargo carriers, as well
as manufacturers, are reticent to report theft losses for
fear that if some losses were made public, customer

confidence in particular carriers as well as manufacturers
might be inihibited (Publicover, 1999). The cargo

transportation industry, therefore, often viewed it as less
costly to absorb smaller losses and have insurance only
cover larger loss claims.
Additional reasons for non-reporting and

underreporting cited by the GAO study include the fact that
carriers feared manufacturers might shift business to

another carrier due to security concerns; carriers wanted

ability of competitors to utilize poor

to limit the

security records as part of an effort to expand market
share; carri rs feared that insurance companies would use
theft statis tics
were unable

to raise rates of coverage; and carriers

to determine the actual point of loss during

long or complex movements of cargo, making filing a police

report impossible. The fact that ho nationwide reporting
system exists that provides a data base to measure dollar
loss figures adds to the problem of non-reported and

underreported losses.

Empirical data on cargo theft losses

is extremely limited since no central repository of
information

exists. Presently, only a very few cargo theft

task forces collect data on incidents of theft in their

respective jurisdictions (Toth, 1997). They tend to be

local or regional, which provides only a sketchy picture of
the problem.

Current Cargo Theft Estimates
From tt e time of the demise of the OTS until

approximatel y 1995, organized efforts by the Federal
government oin a nation-wide scale to combat the problem of

cargo theft, for the most part became a non-issue (Tyska,
American Trucking

Association (ATA) Security Forum, 2000).

In the early 1990's, however, cargo theft began to rise in
several areas of the U.S., and one of the nation's first

multijurisdictional law enforcement cargo theft

investigative teams, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department C argo CATs (Cargo Criminal Apprehension Team)
was formed t0

address the growing problem of cargo theft in

Southern California.

By the mid 1990's cargo theft began

rise steeply (Publicover, 1999) and in April of 1996, the
Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI), at the behest of the

U.S. Departrr ent of Justice, held an Interstate Theft and

Strategic Ir itiatives Cargo Theft Conference in Miami,

Florida (Millar, FBI Symposium, 2000). One of the more

important aspects of this conference was that the FBI did
not limit the invited conference attendees to members of

law enforcement. Private industry and cargo transportation

representatives were invited to attend and were actively
solicited for information and participation. In 1997 the
FBI estimat

d that cargo theft totaled 3.5 billion dollars,

During that same year, the National Cargo Security Council
(NCSC), a c oalition

of public and private transportation

organizatio as, estimated cargo theft nationally at 10
billion dollars
increase

in

per year. Figure 1 plots the steady

cargo thefts.

Figure 1. Federal Bureau of Investigation and National
Cargo Security Council Cargo Theft Dollar
Estimates in Billions - A Twenty-Three
Year Trend 1977-2000
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By 1999 the FBI estimated that cargo theft in the
U.S. amounted

to 7 billion dollars per year (Millar, FBI

Symposium 2000). However, according to the U.S. Department
of Transpor tation (Publicover, 1999), the rule of thumb

used by lavv enforcement in estimating property theft is

that only 40

percent of businesses or individuals actually

report the t left. Based on this percentage, the 1997 FBI
estimate wouId

equate to 8.75 billion dollars in losses for

the year 1997 and the 1999 FBI estimate of 7 billion
dollars woul d

1999). This

equate to 17.5 billion dollars (Publicover,

higher dollar figure is more in line with the

year 2000 U.S. cargo theft figure of 12 billion dollars in
losses as estimated

by the NCSC. The FBI also recognized

that their e stimates do not include losses from many

smaller cargo transportation companies or cargo stolen in
geographic I'egions of the U.S. in which the FBI does not
have cargo-related theft task forces or programs
(Publicover, 1999). Moreover, the FBI currently concedes
that domestic losses due to cargo theft may well reach 12
billion dol

ars per year in the year 2000 (Millar, FBI

Symposium,

000), while the United Nations' International

Maritime Organization (IMG) places cargo theft losses at 30
billion dollars per year worldwide (Badolato, 2000).

According to Tyska (ATA Security Forum, 2000), in
terms of ca rgo

theft, the period of 1983 through 1990 is

known as "t he lull before the storm." He contends that

during this period there was no federal focus on cargo
crime due to increased federal law enforcement attention to

the "war on drugs," gangs, terrorism and the problem of

illegal aliens entering the U.S. en masse. Federal
resources were directed toward these problems, and efforts

related to cargo theft were greatly reduced. At the same

time, government and industry combined efforts slowed to
nearly a hal
A resurgence

new breed of

cargo thief emerged - high technology cargo

thieves. Between
there are no

of cargo crime began in the 1990's and a

1993 and 1998 the FBI estimates that while

exact statistics available, there was at least

a 600% incre ase

in cargo theft dollar losses (DeSarno, FBI

Symposium, 2000). This is attributed to the enormous amount

of high-value, high technology products that began being
stolen while in transit. Thieves realized, as the Rand

Study (Dertouzos, Larson, and Ebener, 1999) pointed out, "a
suitcase of

microprocessors is worth more than the

equivalent amount of cocaine, is more difficult to trace,
and is not a felony to have in one's possession" (p.2). It
may also be observed that legal penalties involved in theft
of high tec inology products pale in comparison to those for

drug-related crimes (McKay, 2000).

High Technology Cargo Theft
Modus Operandi

The weakest link in the transportation supply chain of

high technology product shipments lies in the trucking
industry. Trucks may be the target of robberies in several
ways. Organized criminal groups come to learn which
products lea ve from particular loading docks at
manufacturing

informants.

sites. They observe the freight or use paid

When they note a truck leaving a targeted dock

they notify fellow thieves who then follow the truck, many
times in a "V an.

They then accost and sometimes kidnap the

driver, and hijack the load of high technology cargo that

can amount one half million dollars of high technology

product in one truckload.

Other times, they may follow the truck, wait for the
driver to stop to eat or make a telephone call, and then
break into the rear door of the trailer and remove

$100,000 to $200,000 worth of high technology product
within a few minutes. Some individuals who commit these
crimes

are

driver who

rjell armed and will not hesitate to kill a

attempts to thwart their efforts (L.A. Times,

10/12/93). The trucking industry is the most frequently
victimized

mode of cargo transport by high technology cargo

thieves as 85% of all cargo transported in the U.S. is
moved by truck,
2000 report

according to the U.S. Seaport Commission's

(U.S. Secretary of Transportation, 2000).

Railroad con tainers

have also been targeted for theft, as

of high technology freight being transported

well as load

by air (Ohlhausen, 1997)

Who Engages in Cargo Theft?
The orgahized groups who steal cargo professionally
have come to

be known to law enforcement as "crews"

(Steinhauser, 2000). Many of those who are members of the
substantiall y
States from

large crews have immigrated into the United

Ecuador, Peru, Columbia and other countries

specifically for the purpose of engaging in high technology
cargo theft (Ohlhausen, 1997). Vietnamese gangs have

specialized in armed takeovers of high technology
manufacturir g

sites in Southern and Northern California

(France and Burrows,1997). It is exceedingly difficult for

law enforcement to place undercover operatives into these

organizations due to the close-knit nature of these
immigrant groups.
These crews are often aided in their illegal

activities by obtaining "inside information." Specific

10

information can be obtained by thieves on what products
being shippeci, what their value is, when they will be

shipped, and what cargo transport company will be carrying

them, by placing their associates in jobs at manufacturing
facilities. Even a dockworker or office clerk can gain

access to shipping information that can set up a major
theft. In fa

:t, one law enforcement cargo theft team

estimates that 80% of the high value, high technology
truckload th

fts that they are currently investigating

involve complicity

between the truck drivers and the

thieves (Morales, 2000).

A Cargo Theft Crew Profile

As previously stated, many of the organized
professional cargo theft groups known as crews have
immigrated t.o the United States from various countries
across the world. Cuban crews are based in Florida and

conduct thed.r theft activities primarily throughout the
Southeastern United States (Morales, 2000), Per the FBI

(Internal Memo, 2000), Southern California plays host to

three ethnic groups that account for the majority of cargo

theft in the region. They are, in order of activity,

Hispanic (primarily Ecuadorian), African-American (mainly

11

older Crip and Blood street gang members who have graduated
from traditional gang activity to cargo theft), and Asian

(mostly young Vietnamese gang members, almost exclusively
engaging in high technology product thefts).
The foremost ethnically based crew in Southern

California engaging in cargo theft, particularly high
technology product theft, consists of Ecuadorian nationals
(Choo, 2001). While the Ecuadorian group is by no means the

only organized cargo theft group in operation in Southern
California, their activity, which is believed to have

commenced in the early 1990's, has been prodigious. Choo
(2001) states that law enforcement has identified a network
of over 300 Ecuadorian nationals, many in this country
illegally, as cargo theft crew members. Jefcoat (2001),

disputes this figure and states that the Ecuadorian
organization must be viewed in it's totality, i.e., not
only focusing on the number of identified crew members who
actually perform thefts, but also broadening the scope to
include those who finance the organization, and those who
store, fence, and distribute the stolen cargo. Jefcoat

contends that the Ecuadorian organization is over 3,000
individuals. These individuals are located in New York,

Florida, and San Jose, CA. However, both Choo and Jefcoat

12

agree that Los Angeles appears to be their center of
operations and home to the hierarchy of the organization.
Known Ecuadorian crew members have been found to range

in age from 18 to 65 years, with the notable exception of
an 86 year^old Ecuadorian arrested recently in San Jose,
CA., who occupied a "minor" position in their organization.
While the organization

females, too,

is comprised primarily Of males,

perform functions such as drivers of

"spotter" or "chase" vehicles that are used to run
interference

with law enforcement in the event of a pursuit

following a theft. Female members are also used to rent

vehicles used in thefts. It has been determined that many
of the male

Ecuadorian crew members have military and/or

police backgrounds in their native country (Jefcoat, 2001).
It is belie Aed that this fact accounts for their highly

skilled ade]stness in counter-surveillance techniques, which

have many times compromised law enforcement surveillance of
the group. It has also been noted that they appear to be

very familiar with the capabilities of different video
camera systems
facilities

employed by high technology manufacturing

in the monitoring of activity around facility

perimeters. and have avoided, for the most part, being

13

identified by video systems by staying out of range of the
cameras.

As stated, Choo (2001), believes that over 300
individuals

lave been identified as being part of this

Ecuadorian cargo
members of t his

theft group throughout the U.S. The
group are highly mobile and frequently

rotate from Florida to San Jose to New York and to Los

Angeles. The leader of the group dispatches individuals to
the separate "cells" of the organization throughout the

country. The leader is also known to have, at times, taken
"orders" for specific types of high technology products

from potential buyers and then ordered crews to "shop"
various manufacturing and shipping locations throughout the

country in an effort to locate and steal large quantities
of the desired product(Choo, 2001). At other times thefts

occur without prior knowledge of exactly what produch is
stolen, only knowing that the theft will involve some type

of high technology product. When the product is stolen, it

is quickly distributed to "fences,"

many times within only

a few hours. These crews demonstrate an almost admirable

"work ethic"

in that they generally engage in some form of

surveillance

or search for some form of potential product

to steal on at least a five day per week basis (Zavala,

14

2001). Over the last decade these crews have evolved in
terms of their tactics. During the early 1990's, they were

using their own personal vehicles for surveillance activity
and thefts. By 1995-1996 most crews began utilizing rental
vehicles, generally favoring the usage of vans, SUV's, and
occasionally large sedans for their activities. Many times,
just prior to the commission of a theft, they will place
paper bags over the license plates of their vehicle,
although it recently has been noted that they are

apparently applying false paper license plates over the
legitimate plates, and easily remove the paper plates after
a theft.

In terms of surveillance activity, many of the males
wear work-type garb, giving them the appearance of
construction workers, mechanics, or delivery drivers. This
allows them

to ,casually walk around the area of potential

targets without raising suspicion as to who they are and

what they are doing in the area. The crews will perform

surveillance of high technology manufacturing and shipping
sites and learn shipping patterns and volumes of shipments,
Truck drive rs

picking up high technology freight from

manufacturi ng

sites are followed, generally by two

vehicles, the first vehicle being the theft vehicle.

15

usually a van or SUV with middle seat removed for stolen

product storcige, and the second vehicle being a "spotter'
or "chase" vehicle. In cases where suspects have been

apprehended, only the drivers of the vehicles carry
identification. The other passengers carry no
identification,

and claim to be unable to speak English,

They invaria bly tell Spanish translators that they know
nothing of a ny thefts and are riding around looking for

work. In one such arrest, during a law enforcement search
of the vehicle involved, a large address book was found
with over 200 handwritten names and addresses of computer

manufacturers and distributors, primarily throughout the

State of California, but also containing addresses in

Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, Idaho and North Dakota. A note

in Spanish was also found in the address book describing a
zircon timer

for a bomb, which it is theorized, the crew

may have had an "order" to steal (Jefcoat, 2000).
When a

crew spots a suitable target truck that they

know is carrying high technology freight, they will follow
the vehicle;, sometimes throughout the entire day (the
favored time to strike is between 1500-1900 hours, when

traffic congestion slows police response time and hampers
pursuits), until the driver stops to take a break, makes a

16

telephone cal 1, or leaves his or her vehicle unattended
while making another delivery. At that point, the entire

"rig" may be stolen or the crew will break into the rear

door of the freight trailer and quickly remove as much high
technology freight as is possible before being spotted.
It is of interest to note that while incidents of

violence have occurred during the commission of thefts
involving other ethnic groups, in most scenarios the
Ecuadorian thieves

intentionally avoid engaging in physical

confrontatic ns. When the lookout alerts those in the

process of removing freight from a trailer that they have
beeh "made" in the act of theft, the thieves immediately

drop what they are carrying and flee without threat or

confrontation. Typically, the driver of the theft vehicle
never leaves his position behind the steering wheel and a
lookout in the second car is in constant cell phone or two-

way radio communication with the driver. While other
passengers

from the first vehicle perform the theft. The

timing and execution exhibited during the course of the
robberies is

near perfect and the robberies are clearly

well planned. As mentioned, violence is eschewed. It is
believed that the Ecuadorian crews are aware of law

enforcemenl policies and procedures, as well as the laws of
17

the U.S., and they realize that if their activities turn
considerable pressure from law enforcement

violent that

would result,

and that violent crimes carry much heavier

penalties th an
In terms

unarmed theft.

of arrest and prosecution of the Ecuadorian

crews, Choo states that since June of 1998 through January

of 2001, only five crews have been arrested nationwide and
that within

approximately one week of each set of arrests,
been replenished with other Ecuadorians,

the crew hac

Furthermore, thus far law enforcement has not been able to

place even one undercover operative into an Ecuadorian
crew. Choo cites two reasons for this. First, the tightly

knit Ecuadorian cultural background will not permit any

"outsiders,^' even other Central and South American
immigrants into the crews. Secondly, the backgrounds of
crew members are closely examined to ascertain the identity
of any rela tives who still reside in Ecuador. Should a crew
member ever

cooperate with American law enforcement, the

relatives in Ecuador would be the target for reprisal.
On occasions when Ecuadorian crew members are

arrested, t hey invariably insist to law enforcement and to
the INS that

they are Mexican nationals and demand to be

sent to Mex ico.

Once sent to Mexico, they quickly return to

18

resume their criminal activities. One tactic

the U.S. and

recently developed is.to question those arrested in the
presence of :he INS to describe the Mexican flag, name the
President of

Mexico, or answer other questions that.

presumably a Mexican national would know at least some of

to. The Ecuadorians apparently have not been

the answers

coached on such subjects and often failed to answer such

questions correctly. Law enforcement believes that once
deported back to Ecuador, some of these individuals may
have been killed for their "failure" (Choo, 2001).

Law enforcement has also noted that when Ecuadorian
crew members who have been arrested in cargo thefts are

brought to trial, that other Ecuadorians, primarily
females, are sent to attend the trials and report back to
the leadership

of the organization as to what transpired in

Court and w hat

the defendants stated. Recently, two female

crew members were observed leaving Los Angeles via airplane
to attend a trial in San Jose and then were observed

immediately flying back to Los Angeles at the conclusion of
the trial.

presumably to report on what had occurred during

the trial.
As fai"

as convictions, when crew members are caught,

they generally

"plead out" and with no proven criminal
19

history in t le

U.S. they are sentenced to probation and/or

^ith a fine, which is promptly paid by the

time served

'

Ecuadorian organization.

Law enforcement has also noted that Ecuadorian crew

been so bold as to enter "cop bars" where

members have

Hispanic officers are known to congregate when off duty. It
is believed

that the purpose in this activity is to

identify potential Hispanic law enforcement undercover
operatives (Choo,2001).
Law enforcement has also identified certain bars,

parks and locations of soccer matches where Ecuadorian crew
members con gregate.

Lookouts are generally posted at

gatherings, many times cruising the area on bicycles
looking for police. In several instances the lookouts have
been able to

compromise law enforcement surveillance

activity (Choo,2001).

As stated by Choo, "the scope of the Ecuadorian crew

organization is so enormous that no one law enforcement
agency can handle it - a nationwide task force is needed."

He sees a lack of communication and inter-agency

cooperation as major impediments to combating the
Ecuadorian

crews. Choo summarized the problem succinctly by

stating "without communication everyone (individual law
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enforcement agencies) is an island, and islands are
sinking..."

The Fencing of Stolen High
Technology Freight
The sales

pipeline of stolen high technology freight

extends itself on a worldwide basis. The FBI reports that
the fencing of stolen high technology cargo has gone from

being an interstate problem to one of international scope.

Stolen loads of high technology freight have been traced to

countries bordering the U.S. such as Mexico and Canada and
also to more adversarial countries such as Jordan, Iran and

Iraq (Millar, ATA Forum, 2000). Other thefts have occurred
where stolen high technology products have been found in
countries such as Ireland and Australia within 72 hours of

their being stolen in the U.S. (Ohlhausen, 1997). Of note
is the fact

that thieves can get a high price on stolen

high technology product- up to 50% or more of the market

value of trie product as opposed to the more common 10% on
other stolen goods (Ohlhausen, 1997).

This fact, coupled

with the existence of a plethora of both "black market" and

"grey market" buyers of stolen goods, insures that quick
and profitable turnover of stolen high technology products
can be accomplished.
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While illegal

sell stolen

"black market" fences knowingly buy and

goods, "grey market" fences are legitimate

businesses that also deal in the buying and selling of
stolen high technology products along with legally obtained

products of the same nature (Steffensmeir, 1986). Due to

their appearance of legitimacy, they are difficult to
identify.

In addition to the problem of identifying fences, many
high technology products are not traceable due to
manufacturers not recording the serial numbers for their

products until the product has been sold on;the market and
buyers send in warrantee cards citing the serial number on

the products.
similar to

The FBI (Internal Memo, 2000) states that

cargo theft crews, many fencing operations can

be categorized along ethnic lines, with the multi-national
nature of these fencing networks aiding in the"
international distribution of stolen goods. Large-scale

Middle Eastern, Asian, Israeli, Hispanic, Russian and

Armenian fencing operations exist both in Southern
California and nationally.

Lastly, while fences fuel the thefts of high
technology products by organized crews of cargo thieves,
the fences

themselves are fueled by the ever increasing
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wor:ldwide consumer demand for high technology products. The

continued grbwth of the high technology industry, driven by
technologies1 advances and the subsequent development of
new products then becomes the point of origin in the cycle

of high technology theft. Therefore, an examination of the
past, preser t, and future predicted growth of the high

technology manufacturing industry is in order.
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CHAPTER TWO

THE GROWTH OF THE HIGH

TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRY

Introduction

The high technology product manufacturing industry is
one of the most dynamic industries in the United States and
the world. This industry has grown to be a major
to the American economic engine (Mandel, 1997)

contributor

and it is still growing at a rapid pace. For the purposes

of this study, the term "high technology manufacturing"
encompasses

the production of computers, computer

components, and computer peripherals manufactured within
the United

States. Computers are defined as any electronic

machinery or equipment which incorporates a central

processing unit (CPU) for the purpose of performing
functions such as measuring, displaying and calculating.
The term "computers" includes devices known as

supercomputers, mainframe devices, minicomputers,

microcomputers (or personal computers known as PC's),
workstations and laptop computers. Computer peripheral

equipment includes miscellaneous computer accessories which
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support the activities of the computer's CPU including, but
not limited

to, printers, optical scanners, graphic

displays kno wn as monitors, and input devices such as

keyboards, mice, joysticks, and virtual headsets (Hell and
Peck, 1998).

History and Overview

In order to gain an appreciation of the scope of the

economic impact that the U.S. high technology manufacturing
industry has had both nationally and internationally, a
brief history and overview is in order.
While mechanical Calculating devices were first

developed in Europe during the seventeenth century, the
first real

progress in development came in the nineteenth

century when Charles Babbage designed the Analytical

Engine, which was the first digital computer (Hell and
Peck, 1998). Though never actually built, the design served

as a template for future research and development.
Relatively little progress occurred until the 1940's when a
few compute rs were built. These machines could produce

tables of complex mathematical functions, The first general

purpose electronic computer, however, was developed in
1946, and termed the ENIAC, or electronic numerical
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integrator and calculator. By the early 1950's more

powerful and flexible electronic computers such as the

UNIVAC systeb was developed for the U.S. Bureau of Census.
During the 1960's "timesharing" systems were developed,

allowing public and private entities access to large,
complex mainframe computers. In 1965, the first
minicomputer was built, and in 1971 the microprocessor was
developed, which allowed the entire central processor of a
computer to

be placed on a silicon chip, this development,

200 years in the making, led to the transformation of the
computer manufacturing industry.
By the early 1980s, over 500,000 general purpose

personal computers were in use in North America, and the
computer market was growing at a rate of 20% per year.

Technological innovations in the mid 1980s allowed for the
eventual widespread
workstation s.

usage of personal computers and

In the 1980s, the number of computers in use

was 500,OOCi. This number Climbed to over seven million in

1984 and to 10 million by 1989 (Heil and Peck, 1998). The

"cyber revolution" had arrived into the offices and homes
of America
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High Technology Industry
Growth

As seen by the growth profile provided in Table 1 , the
high technology industry showed almost continuous growth
from the late 1980's through the 1990's.

Table 1,

United States Census Bureau - Manufacturing
Profile of Electronic Computer Shipments

1987-1998 (Dollar Figures in Billions)
Year

Computers

Peripherals

Total Value

1987

23,212.6

7,695.7

30.908.3

1988

23.787.4

7.385.0

31.172.4

1989

25,076.9

8.271.1

33.348.0

1990

25,630.1

7,696.6

33,326.7

1991

26.274.1

7,763.6

34.037.7

1992

28.571.2

8,505.6

37.076.8

1993

29.659.1

9.810.2

39.469.3

1994

38.132.2

10,412.2

48.544.4

1995

49.038.1

12,331.0

61.369.1

1996

50.681.5

11,462.8

62,144.3

1997

50,249.9

13,555.2

63,805.1

1998

57.347.2

11,449.7

68.796.9

Examination

of the above table shows that between the

period of 1987 through 1998, the manufacturing of high
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technology products more than doubled, from $30,908.3
billion in 1987 to $6:8,796.9 billion in 19981 Moreover, a
constant fise

was demonstrated yearly, with the exception

of the year 1990, during which production dropped very

slightly (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Figure 3 graphically
demonstrates

this growth curve via a bar graph.

Figure 2. Graph- United States Census Bureau Manufacturing
Profile of Electronic Computer Shipments

1^87-1998(Dollar Figures in Billions)
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These figures take on even greater importance considering

that by 1999 the U.S. high technology mahufacturing
industry controlled 76% of the world market for
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supercomputers, 60% for mainframe computers, 61% for midrange computers and 67% for desktop computers. The U.S.
also dominated the global computer peripheral market,

holding a 60% share. In hard disk drives alone, six ,0.3.
suppliers held an 87% share (Barty, 1998).

High Technology Industry
Future Growth Projections
While

high technology, like any other industry, is

subject to change in market conditions and the effects of
national arld international recessionary economic

conditions. the U.S. high technology industry is

nevertheless expected to continue on a growth pattern well

into the 21®^ century. Barry (1998), speculates that by the
end of 2002, product shipments from the U.S. based computer

equipment industry will increase to reach $170 billion,
with exports alone totaling $79 billion. According to Heil
and Peck (1998) several contributing factors are involved
in the continued

growth of this industry. They include:

1) Sa es will be fueled by lower costs in the

manufacturing of computer components and the

resulting lower costs for end products. Consumers
and businesses do not hesitate to replace only

29

slightly outdated computers and peripherals with new
state-of-the-art models.

2) Technological advances will continue, such as
"multimedia technology," or the incorporation of

detailed graphics, sound, animation, and video into
a computer program. In order to fully support such
complex software, faster and more powerful computers

will be needed by owners who want to upgrade their
systems.

3) The global business and government market is
expected to provide for more sales opportunities as
emerging economies demand more high technology
equipment. At the same time, tariffs on the imports
of computers are expected to be reduced. As
economies mature, industrial and government
infrastructures will need to be modernized.
4) As emerging economies mature, the foreign home
com

puter market will grow substantially. Markets of

Int ernet-hungry

consumers in Eastern Europe, Central

and

South America, Asia, and the Pacific rim have

not:

yet been tapped. Rising living conditions in

these markets are expected to fuel sales for years
to

come.
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5) Nationally, the growth of the Internet continues to

promote growth in the high technology manufacturing
industry. In 1996 10 million U.S. homes and 44,000
U.S. businesses were connected to the Internet.

By

the end of 2000, 33 million homes of the estimated
100 million homes in America, and 363,000 businesses

were expected to be connected to the Internet
(Barry,1998).

Lastly!, examination of the above cited data and
information

gives all indications that the worldwide "cyber

revolution"

is not likely to go the way of the "hula-hoop."

High technology

products seem destined to influence not

only how we learn, but also what we learn and what we do
with our kn owledge.

be felt in

The influence of high technology will

what we buy, wear, eat and even think. The

United States is now at the forefront in the development

and the manufacturing of high technology products. However,
a serious menace to this industry exists in the form of

organized groups of large scale high technology product
thieves. The following section of this study examines law

enforcement and legislative efforts that have been made
thus far to combat this multibillion dollar criminal
menace.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE RISE IN CARGO THEFT AND

LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Introduction

As previously noted, the early 1990s witnessed an
upsurge in cargo theft came about in several major
metropolitan areas across the United States. Ferguson
(2001) states that this upsurge was due in large part to
the nationwide introduction of large volume shipments of
high technology products not on the market in the 1980s,
Then shipments became attractive and profitable targets for

cargo thiev es. In response to this alarming trend, law
enforcement

teams with small staffs, specializing in cargo

theft investigation began to be formed at various locations
across the

country, some of them multi-jurisdictional in

nature. Unfortunately, to date there is no source of
systematic data collection in the area of cargo theft that
summarizes

losses across jurisdictions.

Several of these units provided data on cargo theft

losses. While this data is by no means complete, it is the
best available information assembled on the subject and

performs the function of supporting the assertion that
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cargo theft in general across the U.S. has risen to

alarming Iba;els, and it supports the position that high

technology product cargo theft accounts for a major portion
of the dollar value related to reported cargo theft.

This Study relies on data from cargo thefts reported
to several cargo theft-specific law enforcement teams,

including the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo Criminal

Apprehension Team (Cargo CATs), the New Jersey State Police
Cargo Theft and Robbery Unit, the San Francisco/San Mateo
Cargo Task Force, the South Florida Tactical Operations
Multi-Agenc y Cargo Anti-Theft Squad (TOMCATS), the
California

Highway Patrol Northern Division Cargo Theft

Interdictio n

Program (C-TIPS), and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation Interstate/Cargo Theft Squad (Long Beach, CA.
Resident Agency).
While

data from several law enforcement agencies are

cited in th is

study, no law enforcement agency or private

sector organization other than the Los Angeles County

Sheriff's Cargo CATs Team was able to supply historic data

specific to high technology cargo theft. The Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Cargo CATs Team has archival data going
back as far as 1991. While much of the data supplied for

this study by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo CATs
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Unit (LeBlar c,

2000) were existing data, additional data on

high teGhnojogy theft were compiled on request specifically
for this study.

The Cairgo CATS Unit, founded in 1990, is the oldest

cargo)offense specific law enforcement team existing in the
U.S. Data from the second oldest cargo offense specific

team, the New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft and Robbery
Unit, are also included in the study. Unfortunately, New

Jersey State Police Cargo Theft and Robbery Unit data does
high technology theft from the theft of other

not isolate

products. T herefore, for the purposes of this study, losses
reported to the Cargo CATs Team are thought to be
representative

of most major metropolitan areas of the U.S.

in terms of

the reported occurrence of high technology

cargo theft

The data that they have supplied the most

extensive a!nd reliable data on cargo theft available at
this time,

Additional cargo theft related data cited in

this Study has also been garnered via utilization of
interviews and word of mouth technique.

The Extent of Reported
Cargo Theft
The Lpi s

Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo CATs team is a

multi^jurisdictional unit consisting of personnel from the
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Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the California

Highway Patrol, Los Angeles Port Police, Vernon Police
Department, Ontario Police Department, and has also had
members from the Irvine Police Department as well as the
F.B.I, attached to the team at various points during it's

eleven year history. Table 2 provides a summary of the
growth of cargo theft as reported to the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Cargo CATs team during the period of 1992 to
2000.
Table 2.

L OS

Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo Criminal
Team Reported Cargo Thefts
Losses Reported in Millions)

A pprehension

Reported Losses

Incidents

High Tech Loss/% of all Losses

'90

NO RE=cORD

'91

NO RECORD

•92

$67,181,239

494

N/A

N/A

'93

$96,895,833

625

N/A

N/A

'94

$67,181,239

486

$15,297,086

22.76%

'95

$70,373,874

427

$15,886,540

22.57%

'96

$65,778,154

363

$21,013,214

31.95%

'97

$68,717,404

453

$14,996,507

21.77%

'98

$58,109,425

337

$16,051,968

27.62%

'99

$62,634,134

384

$13,415,225

21.42%

'00

$56,183,939

436

$17,917,000

31.89%
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The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo CATs team data
reveals no Specific upward dollar figure rise during the

1992 to 2000 period other than a $29 million dollar spike
in 1993. It should be noted that computers and other high

technology electronics products comprised little or no

percentage of reported cargo thefts prior to the electronic
"technology revolution" that began in the early 1990s
(Ferguson,

1^001). It is of note, however, that by 1994

these types of thefts grew to comprise 22.76% of all cargo

thefts reported to the Cargo CATs team. The 1994-2000

yearly percentage of high technology and electronics theft
remained relatively constant except for 1996 when it rose
to 31.95% and 2000 when it accounted for 31.89%. The most

interesting statistic to emerge from examination of the
data is that in terms of long-term reported high technology

losses sustained during the five year period of 1996-2000,

high technology thefts translate to an average of
$16,678,782 per year, or $45,695.29 per day in the Los

Angeles County area. Keeping in mind the seriousness of the^
[

problem of gross underreporting and non-reporting of cargo
theft loss5es

as previously cited, and the fact that the

percentage of high technology cargo theft shows no sign of
dipping downward, it may be inferred that the theft of high
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technology cargo theft exists on a vast scale in Los

Angeles County and in Southern California.
The New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft and Robbery

Unit also supplied yearly totals of cargo theft for this
study that cover the years of 1991 through 1999 (Lake,
2000). Unfortunately, no breakdown by product type is
available, therefore no isolated data on high technology

cargo theft can be examined. Table 3 provides an overview

of cargo thiefts reported to the New Jersey State Police

Cargo Theftj and Robbery Unit during the 1991-1999 period.
Table 3.

ew Jersey State Police Reported Cargo Thefts
1991-1999 (Losses Reported in Millions)
Total Reported Losses

Year

'91

$

392,201

• 92

$ 8,243,997

'93

$10,686,446

'94

$13,537,548

'95

$30,878,291

'96

$29,302,057

'97

$18,406,798

'98

$23,700,431

'99

$11,764,793
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not want to show that they have a problem^ with theft
(Salzmann, 2000). For this reason, it is believed that the

data provid ed grossly underestimates cargo theft activity
in the State

of New Jersey.

The recently

formed (1998) San Francisco/San Mateo

Cargo Theft Task Force is a multi-jursidictional unit
consisting of the San Francisco Police Department, San
Mateo Count y

Sherj-ff's Department, South San Francisco

Police Depa.rtment, Brisbane Police Department and the
F.B.I. This

unit operates primarily in the San Francisco

International Airport area and focuses primarily on the,
theft of high technology cargo in transit. Table 4 shows

the cargo theft losses reported to the unit during 1998 and
1999.

Table 4. ^an Francisco/San Mateo Cargo Theft Task Force
Cargo Theft Losses (Reported in Millions)
Year

Total Reported Losses

Incidents

Recoveries

1998

$ 9,722,039

71

$ 4,377,195

1999

$ 5,309,416

92

$ 2,590,382

An examination

of the data supplied by the San

Francisco/San

Mateo Cargo Theft Task Force reveals that in

1998 the task

force encountered reported losses of
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00

$9,782,039 and recovered $4,377,195 worth of stolen product
for a recovery
rate of 44.75%, while in 1995 they cite
00
reported losses as totaling $5,309,416 and recovered
$2,590,382 worth of stolen product for a recovery rate of
48.79%.

This

is an extremely high rate of recovery for

high technology products.
The Sc uth

Florida TOMCATS (Tactical Operation Multi-

Agency Carc'o Anti-Theft Squad) was founded in 1996 and

consists of personnel for the Metro-Dade Police Department,
the F.B.I., Broward County Sheriff's Office, U.S. Customs,

Florida Highway Patrol, and the U.S. Department of

Transportation. Table 5 provides a summary of cargo theft
losses reported to the TOMCATS team during the 1996-2000
period.
Table
5.
o
o

South Florida Tactical Agency Cargo Anti-Theft
Squad Reported Cargo Theft Losses
(Reported in Millions)

Reported

Losses

Incidents

Stolen Cargo Recoveries
(in Southeastern U.S.

(Metro-Dade Area Only)
'96

$ 9,200,000

41

$ 9,975,643

'97

$

100,000

32

$16,869,332

$ 7,200,000

39

$19,612,940

$ 3,700,000

9

$24,149,474

'99

$ 1,600,000(January-October,2000) $19,539,143
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Examination of data indicates that reported cargo

steadily decreased in the Metro-Dade area since

thefts have

1996. The d ata do not indicate that the individuals who

engage in cargo theft in South Florida have ceased
activity. It is believed that as TOMCAT "sting" operations
increased,

the organized groups of criminals involved in

cargo theft in that area, generally Cuban immigrant
"crews," ha ve simply expanded their operations outside of
the Metro-Dade area to from a theft network that extends as

far West as San Antonio, Texas, and as far Northeast as

North Carolina and Virginia, where several high technology

manufacturing facilities and warehouses are located
(Keller, 2001)•

Morton (2001), reports that Cuban crews have recently
moved carg D theft operations into areas around Knoxville,

Memphis, a id Nashville, Tennessee as well as in the
Charlotte, North Carolina area. These crews have modified
their stra tegy

in the transportation of stolen high

technology cargo. Previously, they would take their stolen
goods to the Port of Miami for export to foreign ports,
Rather tha n

transport stolen cargo across state lines into

Florida in stolen vehicles, they have developed two new

methods of transporting stolen cargo. First, the crew rents
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a warehouse

for the offloading and storagd of stolen

shipments and then rents an empty trailer/container from a
legitimate transport business to be dropped at a nearby lot
or building. They then bring the trailer/container to the
rented warehouse

and load it with stolen cargo and take it

back to the lot or building. The crew manufactures false

paperwork such as a bill of lading and purchase order using
the names of "dummy" companies as the shipper and

consignee. The crew then contacts the legitimate
trailer/container rental company and arranges for the

transport of the stolen load to a rail yard to be shipped
via rail to Florida, or sometimes Georgia, to subsequently
be exported outside of the U.S.
The second option of transport also involves the crew
maintaining

a warehouse operation for stolen shipments of

cargo to be offloaded and stored. After offloading the
stolen loa d
contained

company tc

and disposing of the stolen vehicle that

the load, the crew contacts a legitimate trucking

pick up the stolen load for transport to Florida

or Georgia . Once again, dummy companies and falsified

paperwork are utilized. The crew pays the legitimate

carrier to truck the stolen product to designated locations

in Florid^ or Georgia for export (Morton, 2001).
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In bot h

the cost of

of the above scenarios, while the crew covers

legitimate trailer/container rental and

transport, the chances of being caught violating federal
laws involving

the interstate transport of stolen goods

lessen greatly.

Consequently, Florida, and particularly the

Miami Metro-Dade

internation al

area, has become an epicenter for the

movement of stolen cargo out of the U.S.

(Morales, 2000). At the same time, in the Northeast area of
the U.S., Sheets; (1996), states that Ecuadorian crews are
conducting their theft activities along a corridor

stretching from Vermont to Kentucky. Heil (2001) reports

increased theft activity from Peruvian crews based in New
York, who too, have extended their area of operations down
the eastern seaboard as far south as Virginia. The Peruvian

crews, like the Cubans, observe high technology
manufacturing

after load3

sites, follow truck drivers to truck stops

of high technology product have been picked up,

and then steal

the drivers

the loads from truck stop parking lots while

eat, use the telephohe, shower, etc. The loads

of high technology products that are stolen in these areas

by Peruvia ns are many times transported to South Florida to

be shipped out of the Port of Miami to foreign destinations
(Emmes, 2001).
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This is reflected in the fact that while TOMCATS

reported thefts have steadily declined, their recovery
rates of stolen cargo have escalated. Since 1996,

the

TOMCATS have recovered up to eight or nine times the amount
of cargo thlat has been reported stolen in the Metro-Dade
area.

The

California Highway Patrol Northern Division C-TIPS

(Cargo Theft Interdiction Program) unit supplied the data
contained d n Table 6 (Leonard, 2000).

Table 6.

California Highway Patrol Cargo Theft
Interdiction Program Reported Cargo Thefts
(Dollar Figures in Millions)

Losses

Computer Losses

%

Other High Tech

%

'98 $40,418,169 $12,111,118

16.87% $11,010,596

8.28%

'99 $ 8,647,961 $ 2,676,749

47.62% $

6.67%

The

381,343

data supplied by the CHP C-TIPs Northern

California Division indicate a wide variance in the

reporting of cargo theft between 1998 and 1999. In 1998,

the reported cargo theft dollar figure total is $ 40,
418,169.05 with high technology thefts (computers and other

high tech electronics products) accounting for

$23,121,713.96 or 25.15% of all reported thefts. In 1999,
the total

reported cargo thefts dropped to $8,647,961 with
44

high technology component theft reported at $3,058,092.18,
of 54.29 % of all reported thefts. The CHP admits that the

drop in cargo crime between 1998 and 1999 is solely on
paper and d oes not reflect the reality of the cargo theft
situation,

only a glaring problem with both theft reporting

and redording

procedures (Leonard, 2000).

.

The FBI Cargo Theft task force was organized in 1996
and was formed in response to the FBI's awareness of
increased cargo theft problems in the U.S. and was

specifically designed to address the dilemma of high
technology product theft via the FBI Cargo/High Technology
Initiative

(FBI, 2000). This initiative sought to expand

the FBI role and leadership in attacking the cargo theft
problem, w:lile the FBI Cargo Theft Task Force was formed in
1996, the only statistical data available on cargo theft
losses cov ers

the 1999 and 2000 (January 1 - September 5)

period in the San Francisco Bay area and in Southern
California.

These data are presented in Table 7.

45

Table 7.

Federal Bureau of Investigation: Cargo
Theft Task Force Reported Losses

(Losses Reported in Millions)
San Francis CO
'99

2000*

Area Total Losses

High Tech Losses

%

$ 4,611,199

$ 3,880,199

84.0%

$

$

32.7%

519,812

169,812

Southern California Area
'99

$ 41,565,000

$ 11,995,000

28.86%

2000*

$16,250,000

$

18.46%

3,000,000

*January I through September 5, 2000

Examination of the data above once again reveals a
wide varia nee

between 1999 and 2000 reported thefts both in

the San Francisco

Bay area and in Southern California.

Table 7 shows that during 1999 the San Francisco Bay area

had $4,611,199 in reported losses with $3,880,199 (84%) of
the losses being high technology. In the first eight months

of 2000, reported losses dropped to only $519,812, with
$169,812 (32.7%) being attributed to high technology.
Examination of Southern California reported cargo theft
losses in 1999 show that $41,565,000 in total losses were

reported, of which $11,995,000 (28.86%) involved high
technology product theft. The Southern California reported
cargo theft total for January 1 ^ September 5, 2000,
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dropped to $16,250,000 of which $3,000,000 (18.46%) was
related to high technology product theft. These theft
totals belie what the true cargo theft figures are believed
to be, as t he

FBI has publicly stated that they estimate

the total yearly

cargo theft losses in Southern California

alone to currently

total $360 million per year, much of

which is attributed

to high technology theft (Millar,

2000).

Why the Numbers Lie - What
the Numbers Hide

Examination of the above data supports the contention
that there exists a wide variance between reported cargo

the true amount of theft/ which knowledgeable

thefts and

law enforcement and private industry sources contend is
occurring

(McLaughlin,2001). While the ubiquitous problem

of under reporting and non-reporting can be cited as a
major cont ributing factor to the currently available
unreliable

data, an additional factor is that no one

reliable state-wide,

theft exists,
existence

let alone national data base on cargo

and there are only a few statutes in

that specifically address cargo theft reporting.

Most law enforcement agencies do not code crimes according
to whether cargo theft may have been involved, therefore
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crimes

invo

Iving the theft of cargo may be

reported/recorded
trailer loads

as vehicle thefts (in the case of stolen

of high technology product) or simply as

grand theft burglary from motor vehicles, without ever
being recorded as "cargo thefts." Pate (1996) reports that

an anonymous FBI source has pointed out that at least 18
Uniform crime Report categories could involve cargo theft,
ranging from homicide, kidnapping to grand theft, yet no

specific data recording cargo theft exists. This current
situation

between th
the actual

virtually insures that a chasm will remain
number of "reported" cargo theft losses, and

losses and circumstances under which they occur,

Thus, the lack of any reliable reporting system and data ,
base allow

a multibillion dollar criminal enterprise to

flourish n ationally.

Legislative Efforts

Currently, only two states have any official cargo
theft-specific legislation in effect. These are the States

of New Jersey (APPENDIX A- STATE OF NEW JERSEY, MEMORANDUM,
JANUARY 5, 1998- DIRECTIVE CONCERNING MANDATORY CARGO THEFT
AND HTJAC KING

REPORTING) and Massachusetts (APPENDIX B-

M.G.L. CHAPTER 266, SECTION 2OB, GENERAL LAWS OF
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MASSACHUSETTS & APPENDIX C- M.G.L. CHAPTER 255, SECTION
2OA, GENERA L LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS). In 1:993, the State of
New Jersey instituted a voluntary cargo theft reporting

program in which all municipal, county and state law
enforcement

agencies were requested to report cargo thefts

occurring m ithin their jurisdictions to the New Jersey

State Police Cargo, Theft and Robbery Unit in order to
signif-icantly improve statewide law enforcement

intelligence on cargo theft activity (Attorney General,
State of New Jersey, 1998). Unfortunately, by 1998 it was
recognized that participation in this voluntary program was

not anywhere near :uniform across the state. Therefore, the
Attorney General Of the State of New Jersey issued a
directive

on January 5, 1998, instructing all municipal,

county and state law enforcement agencies to comply with
mandatory reporting guidelines on reporting cargo thefts
within 24

hours of the initiation of investigatory

activity. While this effort was quite laudable, the New

Jersey State Police Cargo Theft and Robbery Unit presently
estimates that less than 10% of all law enforcement

agencies in that state are in compliance with the directive
(Salzmann, 2000).
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Moreover, it is reported that due to understaffing and
the lack of

a full-time analyst and a suitable computer

system, that the accuracy of cargo theft data is
questionable due to it's being heavily understated. This
situation is

compounded by the fact that first time

offenders in

cargo theft cases are rarely sentenced to

prison (Sal zmann, 2000), thus the lack of any effective
punishment for the crime in question encourages cargo theft
activity.
The State of Massachusetts has enacted two laws

specific to cargo theft. Massachusetts State Law Chapter
266, Section 2OA (APPENDIX B) provides for a penalty of
imprisonmeiit
more than

for riot more than ten years or a fine of not

$500 and imprisonment of not more than two years

for breaking and entering a truck with the intent to commit

a felony. Massachusetts State Law Chapter 255 Section 20B
(APPENDIX

C) provides for punishment of imprisonment for

not more than

five years or a fine of not more than $500

and imprisonment of not more than two years for the theft
of a truck,

tractor/trailer unit, semi-trailer or freight

container.

In terms of federal legislation, the FBI states that
there are nine federal statutes that can be applied to the

50

prosecution of car(^o theft/high technology product theft

(Millar, 200Q). These statutes (APPENDIX D- FEDERAL
STATUTES UTILIZED IN PROSECUTION OF CARGO/HIGH TECHNOLOGY

PRODUCT THEFT) cover a wide range of issues such as
interstate

transportation of stolen goods, wire fraud,

money laundering, interstate transportation in

conspiracy

aid of racketeering, and the RICO Act. Realistically,
however, in obtaining federal prosecution for cargo theftrelated crimes, certain monetary "thresholds" many times
must be me:

will inter
incidences

before! the FBI or the Department of Justice

rene (Millar, 2000). In geographic areas of high

of cargo theft, such as Southern California,

these "thresholds'* as they are known, may approach one
million do liars

iri any given case and normally involve

large orga nized conspiracies. Obviously, this pares down
the number of cases that federal authorities will become

involved in,

leaving investigatory activity and prosecution

to local 1aw enforcement and the courts.

Federal Versus Local Law

Enforcement Tactics

Another nuanpe of federal versus local investigation

and prosecution of cargo theft cases and cited by Pate
(1996) involves tjactical and investigative methodology
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differences

Pate quotes an unpublished FBI report which

states:

The^traditional approach has been a reactive

one, i.el, FBI agents conduct an investigation
fter a crime has occurred. More recently, the

FBI has

taken a proactive approach to the cargo

theft problem.

In this method of investigation, a program is

designed to analyze a particular criminal
activity to find ways of controlling it and
reducing or eliminating it. One technique is the
undercoyer operation (UCO)... A UCO involves the

penetration and investigation of groups involved
in the theft of stolen property. This is

accomplished by having undercover Agents (UCAs)

pose as;fences or as other individuals associated
with thd organized handling and disposal of

stolen property. The UCAs conduct transactions
with the thieves and fences in order to

conduct their investigations, with the goal of
obtaining prosecutable evidence against the
targeted subjects (p.11).
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Pate

contends that such undercover operations or

"stings" ha ve been successful but controversial, citing

complaints

by local law enforcement regarding such

drawbacks

s: 1) they leave perpetrators on the streets for

lengthy pei iods of time before a final series of multiple

be made, allowing additional crimes to be

arrests car

committed;

2) they lead to delayed arrests which mean

delayed credit for making the arrests, the criteria by
which detectives are evaluated; 3) they sometimes result in
the FBI ta king

actually aIso

credit for investigatory activity that was

performed by several local agencies; 4) they

require large sum^ of "buy money" which many local law
enforcement

agencies do not have at their disposal; 5) they

may actually cause additional crimes to be committed; and

6) they many times require that stolen property be

impounded, evoking the ire of the victims.
In addition to the drawbacks pointed out by Pate, it

should also be noted, particularly in the case of the
Ecuadorian crews that it is virtually impossible to get an

undercover operative or undercover agent into their group.
As has been cited previously, many of their members have

military or police experience and apply the acumen that

they have developed by stringently checking the backgrounds
53

of all whom they come in contact with during the process of
performing their criminal activities.

The Multi^Jurisdictional

Nature of Cargo Theft
Yet another obstacle for law enforcement to overcome

in the successful investigation and prosecution of cargo
is that the crimes many times occur across

theft cases

city, county, state and even international (in many cases
of high technology theft) boundaries (Pate, 1996). Per
Kozak (1995), by its very nature cargo is susceptible to
theft from

its origin to its destination. Cross-country

cargo flows through a network of truck terminals and large
regional consolidation centers being unloaded, sorted, and
reloaded several times along the way. Theft of part of the
shipment m ay occur at any point during transportation and
may not be discovered until the cargo reaches its final
destination.

Therefore, even the seemingly simple act of

filing a theft report can be made difficult, if not at
times impo ssible.iFor example, if a shipment of laptop
computers

originates in Japan, arrives in the U.S. at the

Port of Lc s

Angeles, is transported by one truck to Denver,

another to Chicago, and then is transported by yet another
truck to Florida, where half of the shipment is found to be
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missing at 'iestination, pinpointing where the theft
actually oc surred

may prove impossible. Law enforcement is

many times reluctant at best to take a theft report on an
incident of

theft that cannot be proven to have taken place

within their own particular jurisdiction. Hence,

investigation and prosecution are thwarted.
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CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

The prseeding sections of this study have shown that

cargo theft, particularly high technology product cargo

theft, is occurring nationwide on a vast, scale and that law
enforcement faces multiple problems in combating this

activity, including formidable opponents in the organized

groups of cargo thieves, as well as serious challenges in
terms of a

lack of funding, understaffing, a dearth of data

on which to build strategy, and a lack of specialized
legislatio 1 regarding the problem. Based on the information
available, the following findings and corresponding
recommenda tions

establishing

have been developed in the interest of

a viable matrix of resources to utilize in

combating this form of crime.
The first

finding is that law enforcement to date has

not been a.dequately

prepared to combat cargo theft. Law

enforcement nationwide has been slow in recognizing that

cargo theft, particularly the theft of high technology

products, is an enormous criminal problem, with not only
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national but also international implications. While in the

last few years some positive developments have occurred,
specificall y in the form of the development of multi-agency
task forces,

these task forces are far too few, and for the

most part a re understaffed and lacking sufficient funding
to be as effective

as they potentially can and should be.

This situation places law enforcement in the position of
being an ur derdog in battling well organized international

criminal organizations. These organizations know how to
manipulate our laws and the legal processes of our
democratic

system of government in order to further their

criminal activities. They also know law enforcement

strategies and limitations, and frequently are able to
commit thefts with a low probability of discovery or
capture.
In or der

to better address the growing problem of

cargo theft, it is recommended that existing multi-agency
forces be

be created

strengthened and that other multi-agency forces
to address this problem. To date, the only

successfully proven method of combating the high technology
and other

forms of cargo theft:has been via multi-agency

forces. These task forces need to be adequately funded.

utilizing specialized federal funding where necessary, in
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order that

realistic staffing levels can be achieved,

State-of-th e-art

equipment is also needed. Many computer

systems utilized by these units are antiquated,
Investigators have been known to have to purchase their own

personal cellular phones for use in the field.
In addition to the above fiscally related problems,

one of the major impediments has been a lack of
communicati.on and cooperation between agencies,

particularly between municipal/county agencies and federal
law enforcement agencies. It is therefore recommended that

federal personnel, at least one FBI agent, be made
available by the FBI to be assigned to all

municipal/county/state sponsored anti-cargo theft teams.
The exist!:ig
sometimes

chasm of communication and cooperation (and

out-and-out rivalry) has only allowed criminal

enterprises to capitalize on the situation and to flourish,
The second

finding of this study is that cargo theft

has proved to be a complex form of crime to investigate,
This find!ng

1) Th e
ar

is due to several factors including:
multi-jurisdictional nature of the theft itself

d of how, in particular, high technology stolen

cargo products are distributed nationally and
internationally.
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2) Many law enforcement investigators, outside of
those specially trained in cargo theft, aside from
not understanding the organized nature and vast

scope of the crime, sometimes do not even recognize
what the technological product being stolen is,

what function it performs, or what it's value is.
An investigator not conversant with high technology

products could look at a box full of stolen
microchips with a value of one-half million dollars
and not even know what he/she was looking at.

3) Under reporting and non-reporting by private
industry of high technology losses impedes law
en

forcement response to combating this form of

crime.

4) The existing communication gap on losses between

law enforcement and private industry manufacturers

and cargo carriers hides the scope and nature of
the crime, therefore law enforcement cannot

possibly address the problem adequately.
It is therefore recommended that the multi-

jurisdictional nature of cargo theft mandates an increased

role be played by the federal government. The role that the
federal government needs to undertake involves both
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investigatory functions and the enactment of cargo-theft

specific legislation (see third recommendation). Thus far,
for the most

part, the FBI has conducted investigations

that were i ndependent

of state and local law enforcement

cargo theft units. These parallel, but not intersecting
investigate ry efforts need to be combined with the
intelligenc e gathering and investigatory efforts of local

law enforcement so that all law enforcement agencies are

working in tandem on the problem at hand.
Law enforcement investigators, both local and federal,

need expertise and training in the nature of high
technology cargo theft, and in basic matters such as the

ability to identify high technology components. It should
be remembe red

that much about high technology products is

new, and that electronic high technology is evolving at a

rapid pace

Law enforcement needs the opportunity to keep

pace with industry developments. Private industry can and
should aid

law enforcement by offering training/seminars to

investigators of high technology theft on an ongoing,
regular basis. This would not only keep investigators
abreast of new developments, but also keep them in contact
with the other law enforcement personnel with whom they
could network and share information. It would also allow
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investigato rs to have access to industry professionals who
could serve
would form

as resource persons during investigations. This

a valuable informal information conduit.

Legislated mandatory reporting of all cargo thefts
needs to be enacted, much like the reporting of the thefts

of firearms or prescription narcotics. Private industry
needs to step forward and close the "communication gap"
that currently exists between themselves and law

enforcement. The private industry sponsored establishment

of regional organizations, such as the Western States Cargo
Theft Association in Southern California, which brings law
enforcement

personnel and private industry professionals

together for the goal of information exchange and mutual
assistance in fighting cargo theft, is essential. Also,

private industry manufacturing entities need to demonstrate
a willingness to assist law enforcement in their efforts by

providing information requested by law enforcement in a

prompt manner. Currently, it is not unheard of for law
enforcement requests for the serial numbers of stolen high
technology products to go unanswered or take low priority

in

providing assistance. The attitude that once something

is stolen it becomes solely the problem of law enforcement

is deadly, and only leads to increased future thefts.
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Private ind ustry

sharing of information with law

is imperative in building a bond between the

enforcement

two entitles.

Without such cooperation no successful war on

high technology cargo theft can be waged. Special interests
and outright apathy must give way to the solution of the
larger prot lem at hand and the dismantling of the
multibillic n
around the

dollar criminal industry which has evolved

growth of the high technology industry.

The third finding of this study is that a lack of

effective punishment for cargo theft-related crimes exists.
A lack of effective punishment for those convicted of cargo
theft is a contributing factor to the current high levels

theft taking place today nationally. The low risk of swift
prosecution and the light sentences meted out provide
little disincentive to would-be thieves. Because of this,
many groups

of foreign nationals have come to see high

technology cargo theft as a highly rewarding enterprise
with low risk and little down side.

It is

recommended that punishment for cargo thieves

must be re -visited.

Federal and state laws specific to

cargo thef t need to be enacted and the energetic

prosecution of those involved in cargo theft must be
initiated.

While in 1996, former U.S. Attorney General
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pledged to reverse federal law enforcement

Janet Reno

inattention

to the nationwide problem of cargo theft by

stating her "commitment to increase federal enforcement

combat cargo theft " (Pate, 1996, p.3), no

efforts to

dramatic positive effect has been evidenced to date in
terms of either legislation, or an increase in arrests and
decrease in thefts occurring, as evidenced by data cited in
this study-

The most recent attempt to introduce national cargo-

theft specific legislation came in 1998 when Senator Frank
Lautenberg of New Jersey proposed Senate Bill 1512, which

provided f or national legislation that would increase
punishment for cargo thieves. At a National Cargo Security
Conference

meeting held in April of that year. Senator
)

Lautenberg stated:

The laws of interstate cargo theft have

changed little since they were written in 1913the year Henry Ford opened his first Model T

plant, and when goods were mainly being moved by
horse and wagon. This is why I have introduced

legislation that would bring the laws up to date
and make jail terms more likely for the thieves

(NCSC Cargo Security Report, Summer 1998, p.2).
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The Bi11

The existin g

could not gain support and was not passed,

disparity in light sentencing for cargo theft

crimes as o pposed

to bank robbery or drug trafficking

should be ended. Private industry high technology

manufacturers and cargo carriers should fund political
action committees to vigorously lobby those in Washington

D.C., who are in a position to change the existing status
quo in regard to law on cargo theft.
The fourth finding of this study is that U.S.

immigration policies must be reexamined. A mass influx of
immigration has occurred throughout the United States
within the last decade. Literally millions of people have

entered this country legally and illegally from South and
Central America, Eastern Europe, and Asia, among other

geographic regions, since the late 1980's. Some of these

people have entered this country for the sole purpose of
engaging in organized, professional cargo theft. The nature
:ernational ties that some immigrants have to
of the int
criminal ojrganizations

in their homelands have transformed

high technlology cargo theft from a largely regional
criminal emterprise

in the late 1980's into what is now a

global crit,minal network. It is known to law enforcement
that large

quantities of stolen high technology product
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have even bleen

transported to adversarial nations such as

Libya, Iran and Iraq (Millar, 2000). The foreign nationals
who engage

in cargo theft in the United States, upon being

arrested, either receive light sentences , or no sentences

at all, and are simply deported, only to return the United
States and immediately resume engaging in the same criminal
activity.

Law enforcement has reported to this researcher during
the course

of conducting interviews for this study that

many of these criminals show outright contempt for the laws
of the United

States and have laughed about the lack of

severity of punishment. As one Asian cargo thief in custody
told a detective,
could do to

conditions

nothing fhat a court in the United States

him would be anything nearly as bad as the

he had already endured in his native country,

and what v, ould

happen to him in his native country if he

were caught stealing. He stated "I like jail better than I
like Vietnam" (Hogan, 1999). The sentiment of showing
little fear of law enforcement or the legal system in the

United States is not uncommon in immigrant cargo thieves.

In response to the above finding it is recommended
that the integrity of the borders of the United States
needs to be restored. While our Statue of Liberty bears at
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it's base a

plaque that reads "give me your tired, your
huddled masses, yearning to breath free"

poor, your

(Lazarus, T he New Colossus, 1903), no where on the plaque
does it sta te

that the United States is under obligation to

accept and harbor professional criminals. With this in

mind, in addition to the enactment of cargo theft-specific

laws providing for the realistic punishment of those

convicted 6f cargo theft, it needs to be insured that once
convicted. criminals serve their full sentences before they

are deported to their native countries. Organized foreign
criminal organizations are causing significant harm to the
American economic engine via multibillion dollar high
technology cargo theft. Secondly, anyone with any suspected
criminal b ackground

should be

or ties to a criminal organization

refused entry into the United States. This policy

should not

be directed toward any one ethnic group or

nationalit y,

but rather applied equally to all who seek

entry into the United States. Admittedly, the problems
associated

with this recommendation are far beyond the

scope of t his study. Suffice it to state that current

immigration policies and procedures have only enhanced the
formation

of organized criminal groups engaging in cargo

theft in the United States.
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Lastly/,

and arguable most importantly, the fifth and

final findi ng

of this study is that a national repository

for cargo theft data needs to be established.

As this

study has pointed out, not since 1980 has the federal
government attempted to gauge the true cost of the
nationwide

criminal enterprise of cargo theft. Since that

time, a multibillion dollar organized form of theft has
come into

Bxistence and is currently flourishing in the

form of hi gh

technology product cargo theft. As Ohlhausen

(1997) poi nts out, if high technology theft continues to
flourish, the criminal organizations involved will only

grow large r, stronger and richer. They will increase their

already fc rmidable ability to develop resources which
facilitate more crime, such as additional weaponry,

improved communications and transport logistics systems for
stolen cairgo, increase bail funds, establish more "safe
houses" and build funding to support the families of their

fellow organization members who are in jail. In brief,

these organizations will continue to strengthen themselves
and make law enforcement efforts to dismantle these

organizations even more difficult than it is at the present
time.
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It is

therefore recominended that for the above cited

reasons, it

is imperative that a national law enforcement

operated data base on cargo theft be established. While
private industry and professional organizations such as the
National Cargo Theft Security Council dnd the American

Trucking Association have made some useful initial efforts

to gather information in the form of conferences and
seminars for the purpose of ascertaining how much theft is
occurring,

any accurate national cargo theft data base

would be m'3st

appropriately managed and operated by federal

law enforcement for three reasons: Firstly, the validity of

any information entered into the'system is better insured
by law enforcement than by private industry. Secondly, the
competitive nature of private enterprise companies dictates
that law enforcement become the impartial guardian of what

will surely contain proprietary information belonging to
individua]. companies. Thirdly, and perhaps of premier

importance, a federally maintained data base on cargo theft
activity would contain the most inclusive compilation of
data, as all state and local law enforcement agencies
nationwide could be mandated to report cargo theft data to
this proposed data base
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To ins ure

state and 1 aw

reporting compliance, federal funding of

local enforcement local projects could be

made contingent upon satisfactory compliance with this

program. Of the utmost importance in the establishment of
such a data base would be the feature that all law

enforcement agencies would then have the ability to "tap
into" and share information from one centralized national

clearinghouse for cargo theft activity information. Due to

the sophistication of the organized groups engaging in
cargo theft and the fact that any given cargo theft may
extend itself though a network spanning several different
jurisdicti ons, a centralized information repository is
essential.

It is impossible for any single law enforcement

agency to track enough cargo theft data to permanently put
a stop to the criminal activities of any of the major

organized groups engaged in this activity nationally and
internatic nally.

The establishment of a national data base

would undoubtedly facilitate inter-agency coordination and

intelligence sharing. Data analysis performed would allow
law enforcement to be able to recognize patterns and

trends, as well as identify particular characteristics of
the different organized groups in operation, thereby

enabling law enforcement to develop strategies to act in
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much more proactive, rather than reactive manner. For

example, when a group using the same modus operandi in
different locations can be identified, highly improved

inter—agenc:y coordination and cooperation can be effected,
resulting in more crimes being solved in a manner that
saves valuable time, effort and resources of law

enforcement; nationally. A national data base employing

appropriate^ crime analysis technigues would not only allow
for ascertaining what the true cost of cargo theft,

particularly high technology cargo theft in America is, but
would also allow for the identification of crime pattern

analysis, dffender characteristics, criminal organization
structures ,

and ethnic

case tracking and the discovery of geographic
links between theft crews, fences, and the

component entities involved in the national and
internatio lal
also lead

stolen cargo distribution chains. It could

to establishing links between cargo theft and

money laun dering, large scale fraud, narcotics sales and
transporta tion, and the financing of large national and
internatio nal

criminal organizations.
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Establishing a National Cargo
Theft Database
In ter ms

of who would perform the gathering of data

and maintai ning

a national cargo theft data base,

logically^ the U.S. Department of Justice/FBI Uniform Crime

Report (UCR) would, at first glance, be the most

appropriate: medixxm to collect information. However,
according to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation (2000),
the FBI, which administers the UCR program and the National
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), does not support

adding a cargo theft offense to the UCR program because the
program is being phased out and will eventually be replaced
by NIBRS. Also, the FBI states that a major obstacle to
creating a cargo theft category in the UCR is establishing

a comprehensive and widely recognized definition of cargo
theft. Variations

crimes in

occur in defining similar or the same

different states, so it is therefore essential

that any national data base adopt a single clear definition
of what CO mprises

a cargo theft.

As previously pointed out in this study, there are

currently 18 different UCR categories under which cargo
theft may fall. Cargo thefts can occur from trucks, planes.

trains, warehouses, or manufacturing facilities, be
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perpetrated by armed or unarmed thieves, and involve

kidnapping, as is the case in many truck

violence or

hijackings, To a great extent, these factors dictate how
the crime i s

categorized currently under the UCR program.

Another FBI objection to the utilization of the UCR

program for reporting cargo thefts is that if cargo theft
were now to be given a separate UCR category, it would
dilute almost 70 years of data that has been used for ,

comparison purposes. The FBI also states that utilizing the
UCR for this purpose would place an undue hardship on the
present co operative

statistical effort of almost 17,000

city, county and state law enforcement agencies presently
voluntarily reporting data on crimes. Instead, the FBI
recommends

the use of the NIBRS system to collect cargo

The Bureau states that cargo theft data can be

theft data
extracted

from NIBRS simply by querying location and/or

cost analysis as most cargo thefts are of a higher dollar
value than

a typical larceny theft. The FBI further

maintains that NIBRS allows for more detailed collection of
crime date,,

which would include the location of a specific

incident. the relationship between victim and offender, and

a comprehensive description of the property involved in any
theft. The FBI contends that NIBRS is a more comprehensive
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and detailed source of information than the data summary of
the UCR pre gram.

At the present time, however, only 10% of

the population of the U.S. is included under the NIBRS

program, but that percentage will increase over time.
NIBRS, per the FBI's contention, will permit the

collection,

analysis, and reporting of data on cargo theft

that will enable law enforcement to assess the extent of

cargo theft losses and to develop a appropriate responses

to the problem. At the very least, the NIBRS program is a
long awaited start in the right direction.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

Comments on This Study

This study has attempted to bring to light the extent;
of the national criminal problem of cargo theft,

particularly that of high technology product theft, and to
describe t'.le

"who, what, when, where, how and why" of this

multibilli Dn

dollar criminal industry. This study has shown

that as th is

problem increased to alarming levels in last

decade as

evidenced by the National Cargo Security Council

2000 estimate

dollars per
dollars in
an almost

of cargo theft losses reaching 12 billion

year, and the 1999 FBI estimate of 7 billion
yearly cargo theft losses. The study discusses

benign neglect of the problem that exists on the

federal level.
This

neglect is perhaps best exemplified by there

being no c.ttempt made by the federal government to access
the true cost of cargo theft losses since 1980, over twenty

years ago. This study has also pointed out that the "cyber
revolutioA" of the last decade not only produced a
burgeoninc technological industry in the form of the high

technology product manufacturing and distribution system.
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which adds

greatly to fueling the American economic engine.

but also that a "down side" to this economic boom exists in
the growth of highly organized criminal groups who
specialize in the large scale theft of high technology

products. Law enforcement, to date, unfortunately has been
shown to be behind the growth curve of the criminal

industry that has developed, with the only hope to
successfully combat this crime lying in specialized multijurisdictional teams, which are hampered by being
understaffed, under funded, and not organized on a national
level.

Recommendations provided by this study include the
funding an d training of multi-jurisdictional task forces to
combat cargo

theft nationally, an increased role to be

played by federal law enforcement, legislation including
mandatory reporting of cargo theft and effective punishment
for cargo theft-related crimes, as well as the
reexamination

of U.S. immigration policy as it relates to

criminals.

Perhaps most importantly, it is the recommendation as
well as the fervent hope of this study that a national data

base for the reporting of cargo crime can be established,
(

so that state-of-the-art statistical data analysis can aid
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law enforcement greatly in combating this crime. A national
data base v/ould also provide the by-product of a rich
resource for future researchers in this area of expertise

for the mining of information and analytical data. This is
essential in order to further build a body of knowledge on
this form of crime that can be utilized by law enforcement
and private industry alike, in the prevention,
investigation and prosecution of cargo theft,
As Am

erica enters the 21®^ century, our legislators and

law enforcement

must utilize

officials will hopefully recognize that we

to the fullest 21®^ century methods, tactics,

and strategies

in waging a war on the multibillion dollar

criminal industry of cargo theft in the United States of
America.

Limitations of This Study

This study was undertaken with full knowledge of the
impediments that exist in attempting to present a

meaningful picture of the problem of cargo theft in
America. Difficulties included the collection of diverse

data on the cargo theft problem from many sources. As the

Study states, at this point in time no national data base
on cargo theft exists. Current data were obtained from law
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enforcement: sources nationwide, and were often assembled by

these sources specifically for this study. Data of a
historical

nature is difficult, if not at times impossible.
While it has been my earnest desire to be

to come by

precise in citing the amount of cargo theft occurring in

any given area of the U.S. referred to in this study, it
has not always been possible.

Another difficulty encountered was the reluctance of

private industry to release proprietary information on
cargo thefts sustained, for fear of eroding customer
confidence

and the subsequent loss of market Share,

Unfortunat

ly, it is the harboring of these "dirty little

secrets" o n

losses that allow cargo theft to flourish,

Lastl y,

while much of the information that was

graciously provided to me by law enforcement can be made

public, some information and details could not be stated in
this study due to the sensitive role that they play in
current on

going investigations. I have sincerely attempted

to provide a valuabie insight into the nebulous world of

cargo theft, while: at the same time respecting the need for
confidentiality required by law enforcement on some facets
of cargo theft investigation.
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APPENDIX

A:

STATE OF NEW JERSEY^
MEMORANDUM, JANUARY 5, 1998DlRECTiyE. CONCERNTNG MANDATORY..
CARGO THEFT AND HIJACKING

REPORTING
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ifi af

Serseg

Department of Law and Pubuc Saf^
Office OF the Attorn^ General
. CNOSO,:,'
TfitNTON, NJ ^625-OOflO
(609)292^925 \;

GHRis-nNE Tooo WhiCoyernqr

Peter.Ver.niERG
/Mtorney General

ORANDUM

Paul H.Zoubek

TO:

:

Director, Division of Crirninal Justice
All Couniy Prosecutors
Peter Vemiero

FROM:

Attorney General
Januarys, 1998

DATE:

CT: DireeUye Coftcerning Mandatory Cargo Tbeft and Hijacking

SUBJE

.Reporting .

Iisn-RODUCTION

The New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft/RpbBery Unit wa&
established
on June
1. 1992:
assist
law
enforcement
agencies
with(1}
thetoinvestigation
ofcargothefts^d rog,cne ,

t2Vtd idehtifv areas where cargo theft is a recurrent problem;and,(3)to

SnduJ

l..dtag to

ar.=st.,pros.™tion and r„6veo'•»

Stolen property.

The success ofour statewide effoit to combatcargo theft^^^

depends upon the receipt oftimely and accurate information from all

robbery
law enfoircement agencies.

"Since 1993,asystem ofvoluntaryTeporting has been in place ^
has significantly improved statewide intelligence conceming car^
.
ICS and hijacking. However,,because participation m the program .
not bee:n uniform across the State,the database developed to date is not as

which
robberi

comple:e as it could be.
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DIRECT!f/E

i.

Effective immediately, any agency that investigates a caxgo

theft,robbcQ^ of hijacking or recovers stQlen cargo is required to notify the

State Police Cargo Theft/Robbery Unit within 24 hours by corapleting the
theft/hijaGking rnessage(Pile 16)which is part ofthe Crimihal Justice
Informatioii System. TTje message will then be routed to a preselected

destinaticjn terininal at the New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft/Robbery Unit
through t!le New Jersey Law Enforcement Telecommunications System.

2,
This Directiye applies to all thefts, robberies or hijackings of
cargo frohji (a) Storage facilities; (b) Commercial and industrial centers; (c) Air,
sea and n■ail terminals; and, (d) Commercial freight carriers.
CONGLUSION

By maintaining a record of cargo theft, robbery and hijackings, the
New Jersey State Police, Cargo Theft/Robbery Unit vrill be able to expedite the
identification of suspected stolen property, identify areas where these crimes
arc prevalent and analyze trends in cargo thefts. Further analjrtical studies will
identify individuals and organized groups involved in cargo thefts which will
enhance cargo theft investigations statewide.

If you have any questions concerning this Directive, please contact
Lt. Joseph Rogalski of the New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft/Robbery Unit at
732-548-7

iS3. -,

: ;

: ■,

Thank you iri advaiicc for your attention to this matter.

Peter Vemiero ■

Attorney General

PV:mp
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APPENDIX B:
GENERAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS

CHAPTER 266:
SECTION 2OA.
BREAKING AND ENTERING

OF TRUCKS, TRACTORS,
TRAILERS OR

FREIGHT CONTAINERS
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M.G.L.- Chapter 266, Section

GE]^^ERALI^WS OF

Chapter266:Section 20A.Breaking and entering oftriicks,tractors,trailers orfreight
containers*

®

Section20A.\^oever breaks and enters,or enters without breaking,atruck,tractor/trailer unit
trail^,semi-tr^er
container
intent totencoramita
be punished
by hundred
m^sonnientin theorfi-ejght
state prison
for notwith
morethan
yearsor felony,shall
by afine ofnot
morethanfive
dollars and impnsonmentin the house ofcorrectionfbrnot morethan two years.
Return to;

geitSection

** Cliantcr 2<;(> TaWe pfCfintertts
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APPENDIX C:

GENERAL LAWS OF

lyASSACHUSETTS
CHAPTER 266:
SECTION 2OB.

STEALING OF TRUCKS,
TRACTORS, TRAILERS OR
FREIGHT CONTAINERS
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MG.L-C lapter 266,Section zon

vGEffiRiO.LAWS;OF M
Chattel 3;^: Section 20E. Stealmg in trucksy tractors^ trailers orfreight cqatainers.
Section 20B. Whoever steals in a truck,tractor/trailer unit,trailer,semi-traaer or freight container
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or by a fine ofnot
more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment injaJl for not more than two years.

Return to:

'

** Ctvyjitcr 2/^6 T;iW^
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** Le^^dative Home Pa^e

APPENDIX D:

FEDERAL STATUTES UTILIZED

IN PROSECUTION OF CARGO/HIGH
TECHNOLOGY PRODUCT THEFT
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FEDERAL STATUTES UTILIZED IN PROSECUTION OF
CARGO/HIGH TECHNOLGY PRODUCT THEFT

Interstate Transportation ofStolen Property/Sale ofReceipt ofStolen Goods,
Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 2314i 2315;
2.

Theftfrom Interstate Shipments, Title 18, U.S.C.,Section1659;

3.

Bills ofLading Act, Title 49,U.S.C.j Section 121;

4.

Wire Fraud, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1343;

5.

Conspiracy, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 371;

;

6. MoneyLaundering,Title 18, U.S.e., Sections 1956, 1957;

7. Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering(ITAR),l^itle 18,0.S.C.,
Section 1952;

^

8. Racketeering influenced and Gorrjpt Organization Act(RliCO), Title 18, U.S.C.,
Section 1962;
«v

9; Hobbs Act Robbery, Title 18, U.S.C,, Section 1951.
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